De Moor I:14: Acquired Natural Theology and Universal Doubt

Before those things that our AUTHOR teaches positively concerning Innate and Acquired Natural Theology, he would free from the Objections of Adversaries, he interposes parenthetically one and another observation:  of which the first is;

Rene Descartes

For the acquiring of Natural Theology there is to be no urging of Universal Doubt concerning all things, and even concerning both the perfections, and the Existence, of God Himself.  This thesis is opposed to the method of philosophizing that Descartes plausibly urged from this principium, that the Arguments hitherto alleged for the Existence of God are not sufficiently persuasive and demonstrative.  But DESCARTES relates in his Epistola X, part II Epostolarum:  If anyone should propose to himself as a goal to doubt concerning God, that he might persist in this doubt, he sins gravely, as long as he wills to remain in doubt in a matter of such moment.  But, if anyone should propose this doubt to himself as a means to achieve a clearer knowledge of the truth, he does a thing altogether pious and honest, for no one is able to desire the end without at the same time desiring the means….  Neither does he sin, who for the sake of the same end for a time banishes from the soul the entirety of the knowledge that he has concerning God.  That this is indeed the thesis and mind of Descartes, that in order to acquire Natural Theology there must even be doubt concerning the Existence of God Himself, shows the Most Illustrious WITSIUS, in his Het aanstotelyke Nieuw ontdekt, § 11-24, pages 11-29, and in a tract, Twist des Heeren met zynen Wyngaard, chapter XXI, pages 262-267, while at the same time greatly abhorring this thesis.  Indeed, our AUTHOR rightly observes that Doubt of this sort, especially concerning the Existence of God, is:

1.  Useless, since Doubt as such does not suggest a proof of Deity; and after protracted Doubt more, and more effective, Arguments in favor of the Existence of God shall not be supplied to anyone, than those which without Doubt, from the testimony of conscience, the senses, reason, and consent of all peoples, he had known, or had been able to know even before that:  of which Arguments also the force, greater or lesser, is able to be weighed, with this innate principium always remaining certain and indubitable, namely, God exists.

2.  This Doubt is Impossible, since persuasion concerning the Existence of God is related to κοινὰς ἐννοίας, common notions, and innate truths, which by the force of their own certainty exclude all Doubt, in such a way that that persuasion causes itself to be felt before a man might pursue the policy concerning Doubt:  and to such an extent that, unless you wish to lay aside and forswear the light of reason and the conscience, Doubt of this sort is and remains impossible.

3.  The same is also Impious:  a.  For those things, which I recited out of Descartes above, mean no other thing than that all those do a thing pious and honest that intend to become Atheists for a time, that they might thereafter cease to be Atheists; which thesis is in fact impious:  For it belongs to the Impious and foolish to say in their heart, there is no God, Psalm 10:4; 14:1.  b.  While calling the Existence of God into doubt, for so long he lives without God in the world, and consequently without hope of salvation, Ephesians 2:12.  c.  Our moral dependence requires of us each and every moment love, honor, fear, and worship toward the Creator, and faith concerning God and in God, without which it is impossible to please Him, Hebrews 11:6.  And he that doubts of God also regards it as necessary to doubt concerning his own Dependence upon Him, and his obligation unto the dictate of natural Law and unto all worship of God.  Therefore, Doubt of this sort is hurtful to piety, draws away from the worship of God, and is a way prone to practical Atheism.  The goal, which is intended as good, is not profitable:  for one may not, so that good may come, do evil even for a moment, Romans 3:8.

4.  Finally, Doubt of this sort is most dangerous:  a.  For, if there is to be doubt concerning the Existence of God, which is an innate truth, it is to be doubted concerning all other principia known of themselves.  But in this way an impregnable bulwark Atheism and Skepticism shall have, which are able to be overturned only by the help of supposing with certainty some immediate truths.  b.  If any should also strive to obscure the evident certitude of that assertion, God exists, by affected doubt, and thus in actuality wrongly to detain the truth from issuing forth; they have reason to fear lest they fall into the judgment of the Nations, which, because it did not seem good to them to retain God in their knowledge, He delivered unto a mind without any judgment, Romans 1:28 compared with verse 18.  Descartes himself, having whirled about in the dizziness of Doubt for nine years, affirms that he feared lest this very thing, which he had undertaken, be so arduous and difficult, that it would be expedient to very few to imitate, Discours de la Méthode, pages 8-10, compared with pages 18, 19.

Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ οἱ παλαίτατοι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμφισβητεῖν καὶ ἀπορεῖν ἐφέροντο·  ὄπου γ᾽ ἂν ἡμεῖς οἱ τῆς ὄντως ἀληθοῦς ἀντεχόμενοι φιλοσοφίας, but the most ancient Philosophers were not suffered to contend nor to doubt; still less we, who embrace that which is truly philosophy:  CLEMENT of Alexandria in his Stromata, at the beginning of book VIII.

The Most Illustrious COCCEIUS, in ad ultimum Mosis, § 74, says these words, “It comes here to be wondered at, even a new pestilence sprouting at this time, of those that induce the soul to doubt, whether they themselves be, see, hear, etc.  Wretched mortals, who reason against their own sense, doubting themselves to be, and daring to profess themselves to be infidels and ἀθέους/atheists, at least while they are willing to doubt; thereon they are going to apply themselves to this, that they might question all things, with respect to which they are able to delay their confidence (which the Scripture calls reasonings and murmurings[1]), and remove from themselves the knowledge of God and His ways.”  Add what things are found in his Summa Theologiæ, chapter VIII, § 25, opera, tome 7, page 160.

1.  The followers of Descartes do not escape, contending that Doubt is nothing other than a suspension of judgment:  although, a.  Doubt and suspension of judgment do differ from each other, as antecedent and consequent.  Doubt is, of course, a fluctuation of Judgment, vacillating between two opposed opinions; by which fluctuation, on account of the more or less equal weight of reasons on both sides, one inclines sometime more to this side, sometimes more to that side.  Which vacillation the suspension of peremptory Judgment follows:  in which, inasmuch as the mind frees itself and passes unto either, one undertakes both to seek and to examine reasons.  And so the suspension of Judgment already supposes Doubt, which ought not to have a place except in doubtful matters.  b.  But, that Descartes understood by Doubt something more than a simple suspension of assent and examination of reasons, is able to be gathered, α.  from the similitudes by which Descartes illustrates the activity of Doubting, as of the pulling down of a house unto its foundations, so that a better might be able to be built up in its place; of a basket full of fruit, from which all things are indiscriminately cast out, when we fear that any of them might be putrid, so that thereafter those things, which we observe to be uncorrupted, we might recover with the rest left behind.  β.  From the vocabulary, of which that Author and his followers make use as almost synonyms to the word Doubt, for example, to reject or not to renounce anything completely; to restrain carefully assent not less than from things manifestly false; to invent imaginary falsehoods; to affirm nothing of those things, which previously he affirmed or denied; to shake out of the soul; to remove altogether as if they be false; to hold as false; to reckon among falsehoods; etc.  c.  But it is not lawful to suspend Judgment without impiety, to restrain assent concerning the recognition of the Existence of God, by neither affirming nor denying that there is a God.

2.  The Cartesian objection is not consistent, that we all in sleep or doing something else disregard for a time knowledge that we have concerning God.  Response:  As a matter of fact, negatively, and only at that time, do we not draw forth the act of that knowledge, for it is not possible to do all things at one time; but not positively do we disregard that knowledge:  we retain habitual assent unto that proposition, God Exists, being inclined to confer actual assent at whatever moment.  Consult PIERRE-DANIEL HUET’S[2] Censuram Philosophiæ Cartesianæ, chapter I; PETRUS VAN MASTRICHT’S Gangrænam Novitatum Cartesianarum, prior Section, chapter II, page 13-33, compared with the Præfatio § 9, 10; BUDDEUS’ de Atheismo et Superstitione, chapter I, § 25, pages 88-90.  What is able to be produced to excuse Descartes in this business, the Most Illustrious HEIDANUS[3] has carefully gathered in his Considerationibus on the edict of the Curators of the Academy of Leiden, in which, on January 16, 1676, among other theses they also forbad that this be taught, “All things are to be doubted, even the Existence of God, and they are to be doubted in such a way that they are held as false,” pages 116-134.

[1] Philippians 2:14:  “Do all things without murmurings (γογγυσμῶν) and disputings (διαλογισμῶν, or reasonings)…”

[2] Pierre-Daniel Huet (1630-1721) was a Roman Catholic churchman and a universal scholar.  He was the cofounder of the Academie du Physique in Caen.

[3] Abraham Heidanus (1597-1678) was a Dutch Reformed minister and Cocceian theologian.  He served as professor of theology at Leiden from 1648 to 1676, but was ultimately dismissed for his Cartesianism.