De Moor I:15: The Idea of God

The other observation of our Most Illustrious AUTHOR follows, in which he declares what is to be held concerning the Idea of God so much harped upon, and the Argument sought from it for the Existence of God.

Rene Descartes

Descartes constructs particularly from that a twofold demonstration for the Existence of God, of which the one is wont to be called à priori, the other à posteriori.

The first stands thus:

Whatever attributes are contained in the clear Idea of anything, those of themselves by that fact are able to be attributed to that very thing.  But in the clear Idea of a Being consummately perfect among other perfections is contained necessary Existence.  Therefore, this by that fact is able to be attributed to that; consequently God also in reality exists necessarily.

The demonstration à posteriori thus proceeds:  Each of our ideas requires a cause, in which either formally or eminently are contained the perfections, which are represented in the Idea.  Now, we have an Idea of God as an infinitely perfect Being.  Therefore, it shall have some cause, containing in itself either formally or eminently those perfections that are represented in such an Idea, namely, infinite perfections.  But in no finite things do infinite perfections exist.  Therefore, something infinitely perfect is given, in which all those perfections are contained, and which is thus the cause of that Idea:  which very thing is God.  See DESCARTES’ de prima Philosophia, Meditation III, pages 21-24, Meditation V, pages 32-34.

Now, Descartes has so pleased himself in these things that he does not hesitate to commend them to the Sorbonne, or to the Theological faculty of Paris, as demonstrations altogether accurate, most evident, most certain, indeed such concerning which the necessity of the case and the glory of God compel to be professed, for he does not think that any way is open to human ingenuity through which better ones might ever be able to be found; he asks the Sorbonne according to its own authority to be willing publicly to declare and testify what sort they are, Epistola ad Sorbonam, page 3.

Now, with respect to these we observe:

1.  That by Ideas are wont to be understood the exemplars and actual forms of the things to be made, in the mind of the artisan, according to HOORNBEECK in his Miscellaneis Sacris, book II, chapter XXVI, pages 262-264.  But, when Idea is taken broadly, for whatever concept, notion, or representation that by cogitation we contemplate, always to denote the actual concept; whence we are said to form an idea, to contemplate and follow it as an exemplar:  then a denomination of this sort hardly fits snugly with the innate knowledge of God.

2.  It is manifest that the clearer and more distinct is the Idea or representation of a thing in the intellect, the more perfect it is, and the more profoundly it penetrates the thing to be known.  On the other hand, it is evident that all and the individual predicates of a thing infinitely perfect, as those predicates are in themselves, are not able to be comprehended entirely by a finite intellect, and that to such an extent no adequate Idea of God is given.  Indeed, the more deeply we penetrate into the knowledge of the divine perfections, the more our cogitations are almost overwhelmed by its awe-inspiring majesty; and we always sense that there are always more things remaining to be known:  whence a clear and distinct Idea of God is hardly able to be attributed to us, still less that God is said to be known by us more clearly and distinctly than every other thing, whom of all things, in accordance with all and the individual predicates, as they are in themselves, the mind is least able to set before itself as present.  An excessive disproportion here obtains between the perceiving subject and the object to be perceived, to such an extent that our mind is generally related to the knowledge of infinite Deity, as the eye of the owl to the regard of the meridian light.  Indeed, the Reverend GISBERT BONNET, in his Disputatione de Notitia eorum, quæ Mens humana nec directe nec positive cognoscere potest, § 38-44, is totally absorbed in this, that he might show that we are able to have no Idea of infinite Being as such.

Gerardus de Vries

3.  That the ideas both of God and of all or most other things are innate in us, which hence are to be held as the standard of truth, is a thesis never proven, but which the Most Illustrious VRIESIUS, in his Diatriba de Ideis Innatis, with great pains has undertaken to confute.  On the other hand, those that love to philosophize soberly thus establish, that from the Idea of anything in our mind nothing is able to be concluded except Ideally, as long as it is not established by a trial undertaken, that the thing for its part conforms to our Ideas.  Indeed, when we begin to appeal to our Ideas as the standard of truth, we hardly differ from the Quakers, having recourse to their inner light, and from this evaluating all things and acting.

4.  With respect to Descartes’ demonstration for the Existence of God sought from the Idea, this adduces a dianoëtic Knowledge of the Existence of God only; while above we have evinced an Innate, noëtic Knowledge of God, which is prior and simpler.

5.  If you have regard specifically unto the Demonstration à priori set forth above, you would indeed say that this is a bare and vain Circular Argument; seeing that, by supposing that which is in Question, namely, whether God exists, one proves only that God exists necessarily.  It is not proper to infer anything from this syllogism, except conditionally; if the thing exists outside of my mind in all respects similar to the Idea, which I have of it.  And to such an extent the Atheist will be able to concede all this, namely, that necessary Existence pertains to the Essence of Being, the Idea of which you represent to yourself:  yet he will not be moved from his opinion until you give a proof of the Existence of a Being of this sort outside of the mind.  For, just as I say that necessary Existence is contained in the distinct Idea of a consummately perfect Being; so also it is permissible to say that in the Idea of a mountain actually burning, of a candle actually shining, of a horse actually flying, actual Existence is necessarily involved; for, unless they exist, they are not able to burn, to light, to fly.  But this bond shall remain true, even if there be no burning mountain, no lighting candle, no flying horse, outside of the mind; neither is the actual existence of these things proven in this manner.

It does not help, with the Most Illustrious BURMAN,[1] in his Synopsi Theologiæ, tome I, book I, chapter XIV, § 8, to add for the sake of illustration, To exist necessarily is as clearly and necessarily perceived to be contained in the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, as the concept of a mountain in the concept of a valley; even as the nature of a triangle is not able to be distinctly conceived, unless it is understood to have three angles equal to two right angles.  For these things will always be true, even if there remain no mountain, no valley, no triangle, outside my Idea in the nature of things.

The Eminent NIEUWENTYT, in his Gronden van Zekerheid, part II, chapter XXII, has provided an ample examination of this reasoning, and has brought its shallowness into the light.  He then, in Gronden van Zekerheid, part IV, chapter XIII, shows in what manner Spinoza[2] imitates this argumentation of Descartes, and by similar reasoning gives sophistical proof for the necessary Existence of his God.

It is not to be omitted that DESCARTES himself, in his Responsione ad primam Objectionem, page 62, writes:  “I shall not here deny that this argument is such that those who do not call to mind all the things that make for the proof of it are going to hold it as sophistry, and that therefore initially I doubted somewhat whether I ought to make use of it; lest perchance to those, who might not grasp it, I might give occasion to distrust the rest also.”

And it is worthy of observation that the Most Illustrious Röellius,[3] who stirred up sharp controversy with Vriesius concerning innate Ideas and in particular on account of the undermined Argument à posteriori from the Idea of God; that, I say, this very Röellius did not acknowledge the force of the Argument à priori; accordingly someone in the Disputation held under the supervision of Röellius, soon after the beginning, asserts that already for some time to him this argument was admired, when he began somewhat more diligently to attend upon and to weigh the reasons, which the Most Illustrious Preceptor and President was alleging to the contrary.  And he then concludes that this argument does not proceed simply and of itself from the Idea of God to His Existence:  that that which is in question is supposed; while the Existence of God is presupposed, and then finally it is inferred that the Existence of God is necessary; for which reason he speaks against the hypothesis, that it is mistaken:  VRIESIUS’ Diatriba de Ideis Innatis, Section I, § 5; compare also the younger VITRINGA’S[4] Dissertationem Inauguralem, chapter IV, § 4, and his Dissertationes Sacras, page 509; and especially the Dissertationes of GOEDENIUS,[5] REEDER, etc., de argumento Cartesii aliorumque pro Existentia Dei ex Idea Entis Perfectissimi ac Necessarii à Priori, written at the request of the Curators of Legate Stolpianus, and published by these in 1768.

6.  But neither is the Demonstration à posteriori valid.  a.  That is, the Idea, that represents God in all respects, as He exists in Himself, necessarily requires an infinite cause of it, for such itself is also infinite.  But the human mind is not able to have an Idea of this sort:  for the ability to conceive cannot be greater than the mind itself; therefore, since the latter is finite, the former shall also be so.  Whence it follows that our finite mind by any clear Idea is not able positively to represent to itself infinite perfections as such.  b.  Yet the mind does know in some small measure the infinitely perfect; but not otherwise than by multiplying finite perfections, and by withdrawing from them all limits and imperfections; and finally by judging that it is greater than what can be comprehended by a finite mind.  All which are able to be done by our mind with sufficient aptness, as VRIESIUS, in his Diatriba de Ideis Innatis, Section VIII, prolixly demonstrates.  Indeed, DESCARTES himself acknowledges, is his Responsione ad primam Objectionem, page 59, that a positive Concept of Infinity does not come down to man:  “With respect to,” says he, “the Infinite, or a formal account of an Infinite thing, even if we understand that to be as positive as possible, yet we only understand it in a certain negative manner, from this, namely, that we observe no limitation in the thing.”  Now, that this pertains to the Idea of God, that He might be conceived of as a Being consummately perfect, we do not learn from this, that we thus observe Infinity to be Innate, but that we understand God to be the cause of every perfection; consequently, in Him as the cause we judge that every sort of perfection is to be considered deservedly, which presents itself here and there to be considered in whatever creatures.  In thus forming the Idea of God as a Being Infinitely perfect, the threefold Way previously mentioned, of Causality, Negation, and Eminence shall help:  consult also VRIESIUS’ Dissertationem de Infinito, prior Section, which is de Conceptu Infiniti.  c.  Finally, the Atheist shall altogether deny having any clear Idea of infinite perfections, positively represented to the mind as such.  Which is sufficient for him to deflect all the force of this reasoning, if there be any.  Neither will it help to urge that he either understands what he denies, or does not understand, the latter of which would be absurd; if the former obtains, certainly he has an Idea of the thing denied.  For he shall retort that he therefore denies it, because he does not have an Idea of a Being of this sort as a thing containing a contradiction, neither is anyone able to have such an Idea.  Consult on this VAN MASTRICHT’S Gangrænam Novitatum Cartesianarum, posterior Section, chapter IV, pages 198-217; HUET’S Censuram Philosophiæ Cartesianæ, chapter IV, and his Iter per Mundum Cartesii, pages 161-176:  add the Most Illustrious WILLIAM IRHOVIUS’[6] Disquisitionem pneumatolicam de Intellectu Facultate vere active, § 28-32, 37 and following, especially § 51-56, 72-81, 87-92.  Consult BUDDEUS, arguing from Innate Theology against Atheists and others, among whom he first of all names Locke, Institutionibus Theologiæ Moralis, part II, chapter II, § 35, pages 397-401, and de Atheismo et Superstitione, chapter V, § I, pages 225-229, on which place still consult LULOFS’ Annotationes (153, 154), pages 230-232.

[1] Frans Burman (1628-1679) was a Dutch Reformed theologian and a Cartesian.  He served as Professor of Theology (1662-1671) and Professor of Church History (1671-1679) at Utrecht.

[2] Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) was a Jewish-Dutch philosopher, and one of the great Rationalists in the tradition of Descartes.

[3] Hermann Alexander Röell (1653-1718) was a Dutch Reformed philosopher and theologian.  He served as Professor of Philosophy and Theology at Franeker (1685-1704), and as Professor of Natural Theology at Utrecht (1704-1718).

[4] Campegius Vitringa the Younger (1693-1723) was a Dutch Reformed theologian; he served as Professor of Theology at Franeker (1715-1723).

[5] Johannes Levinus Goeden (1700-1799) was a Dutch Reformed Pastor.

[6] Willem van Irhoven (1698-1760) was a Dutch Reformed Minister and Theologian.  He served as Professor of Theology (1737-1740), and then as Professor of Church History (1740-1760) at Utrecht.