De Moor I:30: Defense of Discursive Theology

The remaining Defects of Consequences, which our AUTHOR mentions in § 30, are under no pretense attributed to our Consequences more than to theirs.

For example, it is Objected, 1. that Consequences are nowhere Revealed, nor found, in Sacred Scripture.  Response:  α.  Certain Consequences, and indeed many, are certainly found there, examples of which we produced above from Matthew 23, etc.  And in passages of this sort, in which certain Consequences are explicitly revealed, the foundation of Faith is twofold; one in the Consequence, the other in that from which the Consequence is derived.  β.  But the Consequences that we derive, if they are going to be legitimate, ought to be contained, although not explicitly, yet implicitly, in the Sacred Scripture.  Consequences either are able to be regarded materially, as the doctrines themselves indicated, having been derived through the consequences; or are able to be taken formally according to the very connection of the terms; just as AUGUSTINE, in book II, de Doctrina Christiana, chapter XXXI, opera, tome 3, column 29, distinguished between the truth of the sentences and the truth of the connections.[1]  In the former manner, the Consequences are revealed and read in the Sacred Scripture, but not in the latter:  and this is sufficient.

Objection 2:  that Consequences depend upon the principium of Reason, which is fallible.  Response:  1.  The foundation is one thing, upon which something depends; the instrument is another, of which we make use to acquire knowledge of that thing for ourselves.  But Reason here is only the instrument to derive Consequences, not the foundation on which they depend.  Thus, when I demonstrate the Divinity of Sacred Scripture from the Marks Inscribed with the help of ratiocination, that Divinity cannot be said to be founded on Reason, or to depend upon Reason:  it is founded on the Sacred Scripture itself, and those Criteria are of themselves in the Scripture; but only by the help of Reason are they known by us, and drawn out of the Sacred Books.  Thus, when I believe what I see, that truth does not depend upon my sight; but upon the nature and existence of the thing itself, which, except it exist, I would not be able to discern it; and so sight is only an instrument through which I know.  2.  Neither is Reason always and in all fallible; not if, illuminated by the Holy Spirit, it follow the leading of Scripture, and derive Consequences immediately founded on eternal truths.

Objection 3:  that Reason is blind.  Response:  We speak of Reason illuminated by the Holy Spirit, whose grace, illuminating and sanctifying, removes both the Blindness of Reason, and its conflict with Revelation.

Objection 4:  that the multitude does not grasp consequences.  Response:  Our AUTHOR rightly affirms that this is false concerning legitimate and immediate Consequences, which Natural Logic teaches all:  so, if in order to prove that the twelfth hour has already passed, or that the third hour has not yet come, one shall make use of this argument, that it is now the second hour; even the simplest rustic shall be able to apprehend the tie between those two truths.

Objection 5:  The Conclusion in a Syllogism follows the Weaker proposition; Therefore, the Conclusion shall always follow Reason and be fallible:  since in the deriving of Consequences the second of the Premises is sought from Reason.  Response:  1.  This is an abuse or false application of a familiar Logical Canon.  For, when Logicians say, The Conclusion follows the Weaker proposition; they do not have regard unto the matter of the Syllogism, but unto the form, and indeed to the mode, or quantity and quality of the Propositions.  Therefore, this is not to be explained of a Syllogism that has one Proposition from Sacred Scripture, and the other sought from Reason:  but to the universality or particularity of the Propositions, which is called the quantity of the Syllogism; likewise to the Assertions affirmatively or negatively set forth, which is called the quality of the same, does this Canon have regard, and it signifies, that if a Proposition be negative or particular, which sort is called Weaker than one affirmative or universal, a Conclusion negative or particular also follows, according to the verse,

If what goes before is particular, a particular Conclusion follows.

If anything was negated, let the Conclusion also be negated.

2.  Otherwise by Philosophers a Proposition that depends upon authority might be called Weaker, than one that depends upon reason; for a Proposition depending upon authority, although altogether certain, yet is inevident.  And hence Theological Consequences also are everywhere called inevident, because they are principally proven by authority, with an argument from testimony and without proof; not by demonstration, with an argument with proof.

Objection 6:  There is an Abuse of Consequences.  Response:  That does not take away the Use; otherwise the use of the Sacred Scripture would have to be condemned also, because heretics abuse the same.  Many are mistaken in distinguishing various objects by Sight; yet not on account of that is it to be said that all things are uncertain that are apprehended through Sight:  some are attracted to various sins through Sight, but the use of Sight is not therefore to be abrogated.

[1] In order for an argument to be sound, it must not only be formally valid, but its premises must also be true (the truth of the sentences), necessitating the truth of the conclusion.  However, an argument may be formally valid (true with respect to the connections), but unsound, because it contains one or more false premises.