De Moor VIII:35: The Possibility of More Worlds

Rene Descartes

Therefore, God, according to His absolute Omnipotence, is able to increase the created mass, and thus to make Many Worlds, of which sort there is only one just now.  This is to be observed against the same followers of Descartes, who, denying the World to be Finite, by the same deny that the World is able to be made greater, or that More Worlds are able to be created like unto this one.  Thus WITTICH, Theologia pacifica, chapter VIII, § 93:  I acknowledge, that, not only is the World one, but also more are not able to be….  No place or space is able to be contrived, in which a new World might be placed.  And also BURMAN, Synopsi, book I, chapter XV, § 7:  There is a certain representation of the divine Unity in the created Universe of things:  for, that there are more Worlds and more Universes of things, implies a contradiction.  DESCARTES himself also, Principiorum, part II, § 21, 22, affirms, that only one World, not multiple, is possible, because matter now occupies absolutely all imaginable Spaces, in which those other World would have to be:  see VRIESIUS’ Dissertationem de Infinito, posterior Section, § 26, 27, 49.  On the other hand, our AUTHOR holds, that God is able to increase the created mass and to make More Worlds, or Frameworks of Heaven and Earth, of this sort, of which sort only one now exists.  SAMUEL MARESIUS did indeed deny, that More Worlds are able to be made, just as with certain Scotists he also rejected the concept of Imaginary or Possible Spaces:  see MARESIUS’ “Decadem Assertionum Theologicarum,” § X, in Sylloge Disputationum, part II, pages 226-228:  but he by no means assert this as a result of a denial of the Boundaries of the World; on the other hand, he vigorously defended the Finitude of the World with respect to place agains the Cartesians:  moreover, he also acknowledged, Systemate, locus V, § 7 near the end, It is fitting for God, that He is able to make this World, the magnitude of which is indefinite to us, a hundredfold larger, if He pleased.  But this is the principal question, so that the rest of MARESIUS’ disputation against the Plurality of Worlds is rather logomachical:  compare LEYDEKKER, Face Veritatis, locus VI, question III, § 7, page 269.  The Curators of the Leiden Academy on January 16, 1676 defensively prohibited this thesis, among others, to be taught at the same Academy, “The World is infinite in Extension, so that it is impossible for there to be more Worlds.”  But the defense of this latter assertion HEIDANUS takes upon himself in his Consideratien, etc., pages 96-98.

The thesis of our AUTHOR follows spontaneously, 1.  from the Finitude of the World, demonstration of the preceding §, if you compare the same, 2.  with the Infinite Power of God, which was not at all exhausted with the production of one Finite World:  just as by Immensity God could be present to More Worlds, not being shut up within the bounds of the one created World; and also by His infinite Wisdom and Omnisufficiency He is more than equal to the task of sustaining and governing More Worlds.  And so neither on the part of the thing, nor on the part of God, is there any contradiction involved in this thesis; hence its Possibility comes to be acknowledged.  While this Universe, which is neither greater nor lesser than it actually is, is a thing bounded only by the indifferent choice of God.

Objection α:  More Universes are not able to be conceived.  Our AUTHOR rightly responds, Yet new Bodies are able to be added to the Universe already created, which is sufficient.  1.  If by Universe you understand the system embracing whatever created Bodies with none excepted, everyone immediately understands that there cannot be More Universes:  but, as the created World is now called τὸ πᾶν, the all, because all things that have been created are actually contained in its circuit; so, if another World be created in addition, the former alone would cease to be τὸ πᾶν, the all.  2.  But, if by the Universe you understand only the Framework of all bodied due to the composite whole for its integrity; the present World would be able to remain the Universe, even if there be another framework of whatever bodies, but not pertaining to the constitution and integrity of our World (the one measure of which is the idea and ordination of the Creator God).  Of course, the bodies already created by God are conjoined and disposed to a certain use or operation, and so the framework of all those with respect to the parts pertaining to that is called the Universe.  But, if it should please God to create other bodies in addition to these already created, to combine those, and to determine them for a certain use; again that whole with respect to its parts would be able to be called the Universe.  Just as an Academy is called a University, because all the sublimer Sciences are taught there, and one may obtain a degree in whatever Science there:  but one University of this sort does not exclude many others.

Objection β:  Two Worlds are not able to be conjoined, or disjoined by a certain Space, without ever remaining one.  Again our AUTHOR rightly responds, Whether they be conjoined or disjoined, they are always distinct from each other, and so two, not one.  1.  For, the dispute here is not concerning the Local Conjunction of another World to be created with the present World, which, whether it obtain or not, is all the same to us; but only concerning the True Distinction and Increase of the present mass.  It is enough for us to acknowledge, that God is able to create matter other than the matter of this World, and to form of it another or many other similar or diverse Systems of World, of which sort today we have one.  2.  If you posit those Multiple Worlds as contiguous with each other, in such a way that they touch each other; it does not follow from this, that they are ordained to constitute one harmonious body, of which the parts would be for mutual assistance, which is especially required to constitute the nature of a thing, which is one by Aggregation.  By a simile accommodated to the capacity of everyone, REGIUS illustrates this in his Cartesio Spinozismi Architecto, chapter VIII, § 10:  Marvelous consequences indeed!  Two contiguous dwellings are one house, are they not?  If one build a house next to the dwelling of another, would it necessarily coalesce with it, near which it is built, into one house?  Each house, with respect to its beds, contained within its walls, is a Universe, seeing that those serve the use and comfort of the inhabitants; but that house, which is built hard by, again with respect to its places, destined for another use, will be a different Universe.  And thus he shows that the matter is going to hold with many Worlds, even if they be granted to be contiguous.  3.  If those Multiple Worlds be distant from each other, for the same reason that we just now saw to admit the contact of the same, yet not with the coalition and unity of the Multiple Worlds following hence; some third intermediate body could be placed between two Worlds, and by the ordination of the Creator pertain to the essence and integrity of neither extreme.  The could even be distant from each other with no body interposed, which involves no contradiction, except what one might invent for himself out of infantile prejudice, since from childhood he has observed, that certain bodies obvious to us are separated from each other with a third placed between.  But, that this is of the nature of Distance, and not rather something accidental, is to be demonstrated.  4.  Neither ought it to be objected against us by the followers of Descartes, that the concept of Multiple possible Worlds implies a Contradiction; with the Most Illustrious WITTICH these followers of Descartes think, that we would rashly posit limits to the divine Power, if we should affirm that God is not able to do things that imply a Contradiction:  see above on Chapter IV, § 22, Part 1.  Consult also on this § VAN MASTRICHT, Gangræna Novitatum Cartesianarum, posterior Section, chapter XX, § 19-22, pages 379-383; LEYDEKKER, Face Veritatis, locus VI, question III, § 7, pages 265-269.